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Abstract - Smaller and multi-modular reactors (MMR) will 
be highly technologically-advanced systems allowing more 
system flexibility to reactor configurations (e.g., 
addition/removal of reactor units). While the technical and 
financial advantages of such systems may be numerous, 
MMR presents many human factors challenges that may 
pose vulnerabilities to plant safety. An important human 
factors challenge in MMR operation and performance is 
the monitoring of data from multiple plants from 
centralized control rooms where human operators are 
responsible for interpreting, assessing, and responding to 
different system states (e.g., simultaneously monitoring 
refueling at one plant while vigilant to another plant’s 
normal operating state). Furthermore, the operational, 
safety, and performance requirements for MMR can 
significantly change current staffing models and roles, the 
mode in which information is displayed, and the approach 
for conducting procedures and training. Consequently, 
addressing human factors concerns in MMR is essential in 
reducing plant risk.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important human factors challenge in MMR 
operation and performance is the monitoring of data 
from multiple plants from centralized control rooms 
where human operators are responsible for monitoring, 
detecting, interpreting, assessing, and responding to 
system’s states and anomalies. MMR will be more 
computerized, intelligent, integrated, and automated, 
thus shifting the operator’s role to more of a supervisory 
control with emphasis on monitoring, possibly under 
high task-load. High task-load is known to induce stress 
as well as fatigue, with vigilance dropping drastically 
after 30 min of prolonged monitoring. Interactively, 
these factors can severely diminish one’s ability to 
perceive, recognize, and respond to emergency or 
unanticipated events and, thus, can place both the 
operator and system at risk. Furthermore, the 
operational, safety, and performance requirements for 
MMR can seriously change the current staffing models 
and roles, the mode in which information is displayed, 
and the approach for conducting procedures and 
training. For these reasons, addressing human factors 
concerns in MMR is essential in reducing plant risk.  
II. HUMAN FACTORS CONCERNS 
A. Staffing Model 
Staffing is an important concern in any plant 
modernization but more so when the plant becomes 
highly automated and modularized. Increases in plant 
automation will lead to a reduction in staff personnel 
and make obsolete the traditional staffing model of on-
site staff crew for one reactor [1], thus significantly 
reducing operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. 
Automated multi-modular systems will be more likely 
to incorporate a reduced staff model of: 
? An onsite individual for one reactor, 
? An onsite individual for multiple reactors, or 
? Decentralized groups with offsite specialists (that 
are called when a disturbance occurs)  
While an increase in automation portrays an 
advantage of reducing the staffing model during normal 
operating procedures, it is uncertain whether such a staff 
model will be as effective during unanticipated events 
(e.g., software failures) or densely traffic situation (e.g., 
recovery from an initiating event). Reference [2] warns 
of this illusion of automation referred as “clumsy 
automation”, in which automation tends to make human 
tasks easy during normal operation but can also make 
them harder during unanticipating events. 
Staff roles (i.e., responsibilities, skills, and knowledge 
to perform assigned tasks and functions) will also need 
to be redefined with an increase in automation and 
changing of the staff model [1]. For example, the 
responsibility of overseeing plant operations can be re-
allocated from a senior human operator to an intelligent 
monitoring system. Accordingly, such highly automated 
systems would necessarily need highly qualified 
operators with a strong technical background to oversee 
operations. Lastly, with a reduced staff and more 
complex systems come a need for greater team 
cognition (e.g., shared similar mental model/situation 
awareness) and team cohesion (i.e., work-well together), 
particularly during high traffic or stressful situations. 
For example, communication errors can arise between 
crew members who do not share a similar frame of 
reference (i.e., situation awareness).  
B. Human-System Interface (HSI) and Automation 
Responsibilities for human operators in a highly 
automated multi-modular system will primarily be 
monitoring (i.e., checking the system status) and 
detecting (i.e., recognizing that something is not 
operating normally in the system). In addition, these 
actions may need to be performed in the context of 
information overload or complexity (e.g., 
simultaneously monitoring the status of multiple 
reactors). It is well-known that humans are poor 
monitors of automated systems [3] arguably because 
automation induces passive monitoring and 
disengagement (e.g, when attention is directed 
somewhere else) leading to poor situation awareness 
[2]. Because of this, successful and reliable human 
performance relies heavily on HSI design [4]. HSI 
design needs to address the following human factors 
concerns:  how information is accessed with 
automation, how resources are shared, how complex 
information should be presented, how operators would 
control multiple modules, and how automation affects 
on human functional states. 
In a highly automated system, the designer needs to 
distinguish what information is best pushed (i.e., 
displayed without the operator initiative), what 
information is best pulled (i.e., operator would need to 
specifically request it), what information should be 
denied and to whom, and how should information be 
prioritized [3]. Furthermore, the HSI designer needs to 
address shared resources (i.e., “who has the ball”) 
during emergency situations: who will make the 
operational decision, what is the consequence of 
bypassing or overriding the automated system, and 
should operator need to meet a certain qualification to 
override the automated system [1]. The more complex 
or ambiguous the information the more likely human 
errors will occur because of high workload or loss of 
situation awareness. For example, an interface that 
demands a prolonged period of monitoring can severely 
decrease an operator’s vigilance or an interface that 
does not present complex information in a simple and 
easy to understand fashion can cause the operator to 
create an ill-constructed “mental model” leading to poor 
situation awareness. Thus, it is critical that information 
is presented within the human perceptual and cognitive 
limitations. Finally, the HSI designer also needs to 
determine how operators are expected to search and 
scan through multi-functional display (e.g., windows for 
different reactor’s mode of operation or information) 
monitoring MMR. For example, if using soft keys, then 
how many functions can be mapped into any one key? If 
hidden keys are used, will operators be able to 
accurately search and locate them during time of high 
stress? 
In addition to HSI, automation can have a severe 
effect on human skills. For example, less manual 
activities by the operator are required in an automated 
system. As a result, operator knowledge and skills can 
begin to deteriorate due to infrequent use. This can be 
problematic when the system is quickly switched from 
normal operation mode to an emergency mode. 
Problem-solving activities may become slower because 
it may take longer for the operator to retrieve the 
necessary information from memory (i.e., speed of 
memory retrieval is related to information frequency of 
use) [5, 6]. Thus, the HSI designer needs to assess 
whether periodic refresher training exercises or 
embedding critical information within the system with 
pointers for operators to quickly access can mitigate this 
deteriorating effect on human skills. Lastly, automation 
can elicit a feeling of false security. That is, overly 
trusting the system (i.e., over-reliance on system 
indicators) to portray accurate information and perform 
correct actions [5]. This matter of overly trusting an 
automated system was one of the root causes of the 
2003 Northeast Blackout, leaving a major portion of the 
northeastern United States and the Ontario area of 
Canada without power for over 24 hours. Although the 
initial event of the blackout was due to unkempt trees 
hitting power lines in Ohio, the problem was worsened 
by the fact that First Energy’s computerized alarm 
system failed silently and operators were relying on 
outdated information, overly trusting their systems, and 
disregarding phone calls alerting them about their 
worsening condition on their grid [7].  
C. Procedures and Training 
Important concerns with any plant modernization are 
procedures and training. As discussed earlier, highly 
automated systems will require operators to have more 
technical skills and knowledge of the system. Thus, it is 
important that personnel receive adequate training and 
get accustomed to different procedures. Such 
procedures and training will need to be defined for the 
new or modernized systems [1]. Typically, industry has 
used the traditional classroom learning approach in 
which the learner passively absorbs information 
transmitted via a verbal lecture, powerpoint 
presentation, film, video, textbook readings, and/or 
online manuals. Such learning approaches have been 
criticized as superficial. This criticism is based on a 
fundamental principle in human learning and memory 
that information that induces more active engagement 
leads to better learning outcomes [8]. Thus, some 
educators have endorsed more engaging learning 
approaches such as case-based learning [8]. Case-based 
learning approach involves presenting students with 
case studies or scenarios that describe a fictitious or real 
event. After reading the case study, students then apply 
principles that they have learned to resolve the case, 
usually through instructor-facilitated group discussion. 
The case-based learning approach is believed to be 
effective because it depicts the complexity and 
uncertainty of real world events in its problem-solving 
scenario [8]. However, it is uncertain how effective a 
case-based learning approach is in the context of 
procedural skill learning. In the end, an effective 
learning approach must encompass at least the 
following characteristics:   
? Promote a steep learning curve,  
? Improve resistance to negative transfer (i.e., 
interference of new skills by previous learned 
skills)  
? Be cost-effective.  
Other relevant issues that designers must address 
include the recruitment of highly skilled operators, 
whether a partial-training schedule should be use, and 
how often a refresher training session should be given. 
D. Risk Analysis 
An irony of automation is that while the intention of 
automation is to lessen operator’s workload and stress, 
increase in automation tends to lead into an increase in 
system complexity [9]. Thus, the complexity of a multi-
modular system will make human risk more difficult to 
identify. In a complex system, risk can migrate (i.e., 
solving one problem may introduce another  somewhere 
else in the system) and lay dormant (i.e., latent risk) for 
a long period of time [5]. Thus, as the system 
complexity gets higher, the need of human reliability 
analysis (HRA) is more critical. Reference [10] noted 
that the goals of human reliability analysis are “to 
render a complete description of the human contribution 
to risk and to identify ways to reduce that risk” (p.2). 
With MMR systems, HRA analysts need to address 
which HRA methods to use, whether standard HRA 
methods can be used in a setting where many 
operational details are still unknown, and whether 
current standardized plant risk estimates can be 
accurately generalized to a MMR system. 
D. Operator’s Functional State 
Reference [5] characterized nuclear power plant 
operator’s environment as “hours of intolerable 
boredom punctuated by a few minutes of pure hell” (p. 
508). Thus, illustrating a roller-coaster of emotion, an 
operator is confronted with boredom and fatigue during 
normal operation and high levels of stress and 
uncertainty during system malfunctions. Cognitively, an 
operator’s vigilance dramatically drops after 30 minutes 
of prolonged monitoring.  Moreover, simultaneously 
observing multiple modules can increase workload leads 
to “ill-constructed” situation awareness or mode errors 
[2] in which the operator fails to recognize mode 
transitions of different plant states (e.g., refueling and 
start-up).  It is believed this problem will magnify with 
increases in automation and system complexity. For this 
reason, assessing the operator’s functional state is 
essential to reduce plant risk. For example, after 
identifying the moment an operator is experiencing a 
high level of fatigue, the operator can be directed to take 
a break by his/her supervisor. What needs to be 
addressed is how to reliably assess the operator’s 
functional state. More specifically, what methods should 
be used (e.g., eye-tracking, posturing techniques, 
behavioral inputs, such as keystroke, or physiological 
measures, such as EEG), how to define degraded 
performance, and what to do when an operator’s 
performance is degraded (e.g., allow automated system 
to slow down information flow or operator should be 
given a warning message that their performance has 
dropped). 
E. Section I. Summary 
In summary, MMR presents many human factors 
challenges that must be alleviated for efficient and safe 
human performance in control rooms. We highlighted 
several key human factors issues that will be impacted 
with the implementation of a newly advance automated 
MMR, specifically:  
? Current standardized staffing model and roles will 
become obsolete 
? Information displays will need to be re-configured 
to present complex information as well as re-
defining shared resources between the automated 
system and the human operators 
? The averse influence of automation on operator’s 
skills, knowledge, trust will have to be addressed 
? New training and qualifications will need to be re-
defined 
? Human reliability analysis will need to be 
conducted
? Operator’s functional state in a highly automated 
system will need to be monitored and assessed 
We next discuss some traditional human factors 
approaches to address the above human factors 
concerns.  
III. HUMAN FACTORS APPROACHES IN 
ASSISTING PLANT MODERNIZATION 
A. Guidelines and Operating Experience Review 
Reviewing current guidelines and operating 
experience are a good starting point to address the 
numerous human factors concerns presented earlier. 
Human factors guidelines are important to ensure that 
accepted human principles and practices are 
implemented in the design process as well as to provide 
criteria for evaluating design principles that have 
already been incorporated into the system [11]. This 
approach rests upon the assumption that new reactor 
systems share some overlapping features of their 
predecessor systems. In this way, validated principles 
and practices can be roughly generalized to new plants. 
For example, NUREG/CR-6838 [12] discusses U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and 
regulatory guidance related to staffing levels and 
staffing design (See Table 1). The designer can initially 
use the recommended number of staff to power units 
and adjust accordingly with operational experience.  
Other guidelines can be found in:  
? The Standard Review Plan [13] 
? Human Factors Engineering Program Review 
Model [14] 
? Human-System Interface Design Review Guideline 
[15] 
? Human-System Interface and Plant Modernization 
Process: Technical Basis and Human Factors 
Review Guidance [16] 
? Technical Basis for Regulatory Guidance for 
Assessing Exemption Requests from the Nuclear 
Power Plant Licensed Operator staffing 
Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 50.54(m) [17] 
TABLE 1. STAFFING OF NUCLEAR POWER UNITS BY 
OPERATOR AND SENIOR OPERATORS LICENSED UNDER 10 
CFR PART 55 (TAKEN FROM REFERENCE [12]) 
One
Units
Two Units Three Units 
Position
One
Control 
Room 
One
Control 
Room 
Two 
Control 
Room 
One
Control 
Room 
Two 
Control 
Room 
Senior 
Operator
1 1 1 1 1
Operator 1 2 2 3 3
Senior 
Operator
2 2 2 2 2
Operator 2 3 3 4 4
Senior 
Operator
2 3 3 3
Operator 3 4 5 5
Senior 
Operator
3 4
Operator 5 6
In addition to using well-established guidelines, 
operating experience reviews (e.g., lessons learned) can 
be used to mitigate past negative features, while 
retaining positive features of predecessor systems. 
These operating experience reviews can be used to 
roughly assess the initial staffing demands of a multi-
modular system and to revise them accordingly. The 
strengths of this approach are that it requires no special 
equipment, guidelines are endorsed by the NRC, and 
can be completed in a relatively short time. The 
weaknesses are that the guidelines may not be a 
complete fit with the new system, and will need some 
revisions, and in some instances, guidelines may be 
obsolete within the new system.  As Rasmussen and 
Goodstein (1988, p. 179, cited in [11]) commented, 
“Introduction of new technology, as illustrated by the 
on-march of advance information systems destroys the 
blanket of established know-how and practice…” 
Consequently, it is important to understand the task 
characteristics either through a detailed and systematic 
analysis of the task or through eliciting experts’ 
opinions.   
B. Task Analysis And  Expert’s Judgments 
Task analysis is the process of specifying the 
functional steps and operator’s skills and knowledge 
that are needed to accomplish a task. A task is a group 
of activities that have a common objective goal [12]. A 
task analysis can be used to determine the staff model, 
staff roles, training needs, or whether the newly 
designed interface fits within the limits of human 
performance (e.g., attention and workload.). For 
example, to determine the staff model, a task analysis 
can be performed on the different types of tasks that the 
crew will need to perform as well as the requirements to 
accomplish the task. After the task analysis has been 
conducted, the results can be given to a group of experts 
assembled from various areas (such as control room, 
reactor system, and turbine system design and 
operations) to discuss, assess, and agree upon the “best-
fit” for the staffing model, personnel qualifications, 
training, and procedure requirements, and the quality of 
the newly designed interface [18]. 
In cases where the operating task is still unknown or 
ill-defined, analysts can interview experts with 
significant operating experiences to seek their input of 
how the task’s characteristics will likely be defined. 
Based on expert’s judgment, a task analysis can be 
performed. Expert elicitation can be tricky. Analysts 
must be conscious of any biases that he/she may have in 
framing questions to experts. Because of this, it is 
advised that analysts follow standardized guidelines in 
eliciting expert’s opinion [18]. The strengths of this 
approach are that it requires no special equipment and 
can be completed in a relatively short period. The 
weaknesses are that this approach is very subjective, 
discussion can be dominated by certain members, and 
experts can be difficult to assemble [18]. 
C. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
As system complexity increases, the need for risk 
analysis becomes more important. Human reliability 
analysis allows an in-depth focus on identifying, 
qualifying, and quantifying human errors contribution to 
system risk. The goal of identification is merely 
considering what tasks the human operator is likely to 
fail or commit an error. Such identification can be based 
upon empirical findings, interviews, observation, 
written documents (e.g., operational experience review), 
and expert judgments. Once a likelihood failure event is 
identified, the qualification phase consists of 
decomposing the event into sub-tasks in the form of 
probabilistic risk assessment’s event trees or fault trees 
(similar to task-analysis). Each branch in the event or 
fault tress symbolizes, in terms of probabilities, a 
correct or failure response by the human. The branches 
are then quantified to obtain an overall human error 
probability rate for an event. The strength of this 
approach is that it is heavily based on task analysis. 
Consequently, HRA can be used in a variety of tasks, as 
long as a task can be decomposed. The weakness of this 
approach is that many of its probability estimates used 
to calculate human error rates is based on scarce 
empirically-based research thus, relying heavily on 
expert’s judgment [10]. 
D. Experiments/Simulator 
Simulator experiments allow a controlled and realistic 
investigation of many human factors concerns. 
Simulator experiments can be used to verify conclusions 
offered by other approaches, such as guidelines or task 
analysis/expert’s judgment. For example, let’s say that 
task analysis and expert’s judgment concluded  
Interface A, an operator can monitor three reactor 
systems with minimum cost to performance, whereas 
monitoring three reactor systems through Interface B 
will have a detrimental effect on performance. To test 
this conclusion, a certain number of operators can be 
randomly assigned to Interface A while the remaining 
operators be assigned to Interface B. Within each 
interface condition, operators can be asked to monitor 1, 
2, 3, or 4 reactors. Number of hits (correctly 
identification of) and misses (number of mis-identified 
problems) can be used as performance measure. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the results of the experiment may 
show that both Interface A and B support good 
performance when the operators are asked to monitor 1 
reactor.
Figure 1. Simulator experiment predicted results 
Conversely, when the number of reactors needing 
monitoring increases to three reactors, Interface B leads 
to detrimental performances. The strength of this 
approach is its high validity and flexibility. The 
weakness is that it requires highly trained operators and 
can be very costly [1]. 
E. Human Performance Modeling (HPM) 
Human Performance Modeling (HPM) estimates or 
simulates human performance over time based upon 
engineering and psychological models of human 
performance. Typically, HPM requires data reflecting 
the task properties (e.g., details of the task, task 
sequence, and time needed to complete the task), 
environmental conditions, and algorithms to represent 
performance variations of the human operator. With 
these parameters, HPM can run thousands of simulated 
trials (akin to Monte Carlo) of overall system 
performance under different contexts or “what if” 
scenarios in a very short time. Problems can be 
identified and resolved very early in the design process 
before a design prototype is constructed. Thus, using 
HPM early in the design process can be very cost-
effective [19].  The strengths of this approach are that it 
allows easy exploration of new scenarios cost-
effectively, and offers a more rigorous analysis 
compared to other approaches (e.g., task 
analysis/expert’s judgments). The weaknesses with 
HPM are that validity is not as good as an experiment 
and that developing HPM requires programming skills. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Table 2 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of 
each human factor approaches that were discussed in 
this paper. 
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
EACH HUMAN FACTORS APPROACHES 
Resources Strengths Weaknesses 
Guidelines & 
Operating
Experience Review 
Requires no special 
equipments & 
relatively quick to 
complete 
Guidelines may not 
completely fit with 
new system or 
obsolete within new 
system 
Task Analysis & 
Expert’s Judgment 
Requires no special 
equipments & 
relatively quick to 
complete 
Very subjective & 
may be difficult to 
assemble experts 
Experiment & 
Simulations 
High validity & 
flexibility
Requires trained 
operators & very 
costly
Human 
Performance 
Modeling 
Easy exploration of 
new scenarios, cost-
effective, and 
rigorous analysis 
Requires 
programming skills 
& validity is not as 
high as an 
experiment 
MMR systems will be more complex and automated 
leading to many human factors concerns that must be 
addressed before the full benefits of such systems can 
be realized. In this paper, we highlighted some of the 
human factors concerns and human factors approaches 
for MMR system designers. 
V. DISCLAIMER 
This paper was prepared as an account of work 
sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor 
any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes 
any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any 
legal liability or responsibility for any third party’s use, 
or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, 
product, or process disclosed in this paper, or represents 
that its use by such third party would not infringe 
privately owned rights. 
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